

## 1 Introduction

Shang Tang *Geming* (商湯革命), one of the earliest revolutions ever recorded by humans, set a precedent for the future overthrows of Chinese dynasties.<sup>1</sup> The following three and a half millennia would see numerous similar *geming* in China; the wheel of history would rotate routinely through dynasties after dynasties until *geming*, even in political contexts, did not necessarily mean toppling a regime anymore. The great changes erupted in the twentieth century, when the last emperor was dethroned and diverse Western ideologies circulated into this outmoded country seeking a way out.

In Late Qing Dynasty (晚清), 革命 (Chinese: *geming*; Japanese: カクメイ, *kakumē*), as the Japanese translation of the English word “revolution” and the French word “révolution,” was borrowed into Chinese by Literati (士大夫) who appealed for an uprising against Qing.<sup>2</sup> The famous early usage was found in *Revolutionary Army* first published in 1903, in which Zou Rong wrote,

Revolution is the inevitable result of heaven’s will and the development and evolution of matters (天演之公例) ... Revolution is the will of heaven and what the people desires. Revolution is to get rid of the corrupt and to preserve righteousness.<sup>3</sup>

The passionate essay of Zou appealed to the indignation of his contemporaries, exerting a substantial influence on the national perception of *geming*. The Chinese people eventually found their way out of the outworn “Old China”: the glorious saviour, *geming*. It proved to be a period of anxiety with feverish beautification of the gilded *geming*.<sup>4</sup>

The revolution of *geming* has never ended: Before 1977, under Communist reign, various movements were labelled by the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) as *geming*-esque<sup>5</sup> to sustain the perpetual revolutions in order to justify its power, the most famous of which was the Cultural Revolution. Though

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1. Jiuchang Li, “崤函古道与商文化的西渐与北上 (Xiaohan Ancient Footway and the North-Western Expansion of Shang),” 三门峡职业技术学院学报 14 (1 2015).

2. Tianyu Feng, “Revolution & Republicanism: Emerging Political Nucleus Concepts Between Late Qing and Republic of China,” 武汉大学学报 (人文科学版) 55 (2002).

3. Zou Rong 鄒容, “緒論 (Preface),” chap. 1 in 革命軍 (*Revolutionary Army*) (Shanghai: 大同書局, May 1903).

4. Wendy Larson, “Revolutionary Discourse and the Spirit,” chap. 3 in *From Ah Q to Lei Feng: Freud and Revolutionary Spirit in 20th Century China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009).

5. Ibid.

much less used in government propagandas after becoming a sore spot of Chinese because of the Cultural Revolution, *geming* was substituted, surreptitiously and superficially, with *gaige* (改革, reform), which continued to be the Party's fundamental policy to this day.

This paper will examine how *geming*, a term coined millennia ago, has been introduced into and constantly reshaped by political discourses, and how it has influenced Chinese zeitgeists of various eras in consequence. Specifically, it will focus on how the two etymologies of *geming* were induced by necessities to express new phenomena and novel ideologies, how its connotations affected the political power structures, and how, only after few regime changes, its roles in political discourses were completely alienated by the leadership to manipulate the populace, consolidating their regimes.

## 2 The First Etymology and Post-Tang-Wu Discourses of *Geming*

In the historical trajectory of *geming*, the subversions of Xia (夏) and Shang (商) Dynasties marked its very inception. As the revolutions were led by Vassal Tang (湯) of Shang and Vassal Wu (武) of Chou (周) respectively, they are collectively referred to as Tang-Wu Revolutions, discourses about which were mainly around Chou and Han Dynasties, profoundly influencing the mode of dynasty replacements from then on.

Around this time, a religion developed piecemeal when people grilled animals and noticed the curious changes in the skulls: The fire caused them to crack, leaving rather recondite textures of ruptures. They associated the hunting results with the patterns of the textures,<sup>6</sup> and regarded the agency as the order of heaven. As specialised soothsayers emerged to divine the future in general, a deterministic religion was hence formed.

命 (*ming*), which later could mean either “life” or “command,” only had the latter sense at the time,<sup>7</sup> and carried the specific connotation of “fate, divine mandate,” an extension of its usage in the compound word 天命 (*tianming*, the mandate of heaven). As the kings sought sources of the legitimacy of heredity under the influence of the religion, *ming* seemed the soundest and the most potent.

When the Youhu Clan (有扈氏) propagated King Qi's breach of the virtuous tradition of abdication to defame him, Qi gave a mobilisation speech, the Vow of Gan (甘誓), to send a punitive expedition:

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6. Confucius (551–479 BC), ed., 尚书 (*Book of Documents*), trans. Ping Mu (Beijing: 中华书局, March 2009), 60–61.

7. Committee of editors of *Encyclopaedia of Expressions* 辞海编辑委员会, ed., 辞海 (*Encyclopaedia of Expressions*) (Shanghai: Shanghai Lexicographical Publishing House, 1989), 5291.

O! Soldiers of my Six Armies (六事), I hereby make this statement to you: the Youhu have violated the will of heaven; insulted the Five Virtues (五行); and snubbed, then abandoned our calendar. Therefore heaven wishes to annul their fief's fortune (天用剿絕其命); and now, only I can properly pursue and inflict heaven's punishment on them (今予惟恭行天之罰).<sup>8</sup>

The coercion of the deterministic atmosphere, the king's eloquent speech and the following outright victory imprinted in the people's minds that the kingship was the mandate of heaven, and that the sovereign family were the chosen ones – until the regime of Xia was overthrown.

## 2.1 *I Ching* and the Etymology of “*Geming*” (革命, Revolution?)

*Records* documented that last king of Xia, Jie (桀), was such an oppressive and dissolute tyrant that the vassals intended to remove him from power.<sup>9</sup> Vassal Tang (湯) of Shang (商, a fief then) was the most active and significant amongst them; ironically, he, too, gave a mobilisation speech, the Vow of Tang (湯誓), to prepare for charging at Mingtiao in the final engagement:

Heed me: It is not that I am so unscrupulous that I dare to defy and rebel against the king, but that the king is truly steeped in iniquity, and that in heaven's plan he is to be executed (天命殛之). Some say ... “why do we have to rebel?” Xia is heinous, and I revere and cannot disobey the divine will (予畏上帝); I am commissioned to redress these problems.<sup>10</sup>

The subjects of the hence established Shang Dynasty were convinced therefrom that when the king becomes unworthy of heaven's mandate, someone else ought to take their position.

History repeated itself when the people could no longer forbear to overthrow the tyranny of the last king of Shang, Zhou (紂). Vassal Wu (武) of Chou (周) rose up, and gave a similar speech at Mu Ye, later documented as the Vow of Mu (牧誓).<sup>11</sup> Wu successfully took over, and established Chou Dynasty, after which the benevolent administration of Wu profoundly impressed the people.<sup>12</sup> Therefore, it filtered into people's minds that the mandate of heaven, of which an unprincipled and tyrannical king must be deprived, would be devolved upon a sage leader on the authority of heaven.

When this dynasty replacement model began to take shape, King Wu planned to solidify it and propagate that he was the great agent of heaven's will. The famous divination guidebook, *I Ching*, compiled

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8. Confucius (551–479 BC), 尚書 (*Book of Documents*), 79–80.

9. Sima Qian 司馬遷 (145–86 BC), “殷本紀 (Records of the Royal Family of Yin),” in 史記 (*Records of the Grand Historian*), ed. Zhang Shoujie 張守節 (Beijing: 中華書局, November 1982).

10. Confucius (551–479 BC), 尚書 (*Book of Documents*), 82–84.

11. Ibid., 122–123.

12. Ibid., 133–135.

under the superintendence of Wu, first used the word 革命 to label the revolts of Tang and Wu. In its chapter “䷰ (革)” (customarily inexactly translated as “Revolution”), Chou subjects wrote, in the implications of this divinatory symbol (䷰):

天地革而四時成, 湯武革命, 順乎天而應乎人, 革之時大矣哉.<sup>13</sup>

The heaven and the earth are revolutionised, and the four seasons rehabilitated. Tang-Wu Revolutions were coherent with the will of heaven and of the people; magnificent were the times of revolutions!

In this context, *ge* (革), which originally meant “(to) skin,” gained its figurative sense, “to change, eliminate, or get rid of.” Thus, *geming* meant “to change the mandate of heaven,” a fixed expression for dynasty changes used for millennia to come, which even circulated across the ocean so far as Japan.<sup>14</sup>

## 2.2 Post-Classical Discourses and the Proscription

*Geming*, though glorified by Classical rulers, gradually became seldom used as emperors exerted more supervision of literature after 焚書坑儒 (burning books and burying Confucian scholars alive) conducted by Emperor Shi of Qin, which also marked the abrupt end of the Classical Era (先秦).

On the one hand, *geming*, within discourses coloured by the deterministic theory of “the mandate of heaven”, augmented the legitimacy of the new imperial families, endowing them with divine authority, interpreting subverting the previous dynasty as being the agent of heaven’s will. This *geming* then would become righteous as the brutality and warmongering were justified by its legitimacy from heaven’s mandate and its propriety from the people’s support. Especially, after Confucianism gained popularity, *minxin* (民心, feelings of the citizenry, popularity) was deemed as an important factor of the consolidation of political power. The newly founded regime, therefore, would be fragile and turbulent, if the people could not accept its violence and warmongering, let alone those in war zones might have suffered from the warfares personally.

For the imperial families, on the other hand, it would be problematic if the revolutionary model of *geming* were to be utilised as the theoretical basis and the source of legitimacy of the overthrowers of

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13. Wang Bi 王弼 (226–249), “䷰ (革, Revolution),” chap. 49 in 周易注 (*Annotations of I Ching of Chou Dynasty*), ed. Xing Shu 邢璣 (About 752).

14. Okada Hidehiro 岡田英弘, 日本史の誕生 (*The Birth of Japan’s History*): 千三百年前の外圧が日本を作った (Tokyo: 筑摩書房, June 2008).

their own dynasty. For the Scholar-Gentry (notably Huang Sheng 黄生<sup>15</sup>), despite *minxin*, the core of Confucian ideology was “that the king should decently fulfil their duty and the subjects should decently fulfil theirs” (“君君臣臣”<sup>16</sup>), in which none should bypass the boundaries of their entitlement. In this system, the subjects (臣) were not entitled to commit regicide, yet they could still fulfil their duty by keenly advising the king. The current emperor, a subject of the emperor they overthrew, would be denounced as a regicide who disregarded their own jurisdiction, reputing them to be despicable, instigating anarchism. Emperors of Han Dynasty, founded after hard-won warfares, deeming social stability to be more crucial than legitimacy for fear of being toppled once and for all, were convinced by Confucianist Literati, limiting the use of *geming* until hardly was it used again.<sup>17</sup> Rather than preaching the *tianming-geming* model whilst steering public reactions meticulously at the risk of being toppled, censoring writings to obliterate the model of *geming* seemed a more stable strategy, under which more robust regimes were seen in later history.

### 3 The Second Etymology and Modern Discourses

Japanese, during the Meiji era, revived *kakumē* (borrowed from Chinese *geming*) from the numerous piles of Chinese classics long passé, taking it as the translation for “revolution” and “révolution.” In practice, *kakumē* meant closer to “révolution,” a French, more aggressive model of revolution: The translation was still influenced by *I Ching*, which argued that heaven was wordless yet expressed its authority and mandates through the violent *geming* with use of *gange* (干戈, shields and pikes, arms).<sup>18</sup>

#### 3.1 Xinhai and Its Prelude: *Geming* (革命, Révolution!)

In China, with increasing popular discontent with the Qing government, there was a growing anxiety to replace the unsatisfactory dynasty system with Western ideologies, whose Chinese translations therefore sprang up in large numbers all of a sudden. Amongst these, *geming* voyaged back to China, with its new, Western connotations of forcible overthrows of governments, instead of changing the mandate. *Geming*, more than in Japan, was interpreted as being violent and gory, additionally because the predominant

15. Sima Qian 司馬遷 (145–86 BC), “儒林外傳 (Anecdotal Records of the Literati),” in 史記 (*Records of the Grand Historian*), ed. Zhang Shoujie 张守节 (Beijing: 中华书局, November 1982).

16. Confucius (551–479 BC), “顏淵,” in 論語 (*Discourses of Confucius*) (Beijing: 中华书局, December 2006).

17. Xushan Zhang, “「汤武革命论」与中国传统政治伦理 (‘Tang-Wu Revolutionary Theory’ and Traditional Chinese Political Ethics),” 史学月刊 4 (April 2018).

18. Wang Bi 王弼 (226–249), “䷰ (革, Revolution).”

meaning of *ming* had evolved to “life” in Vernacular Chinese then so *geming* could be interpreted as “eliminating lives.”

In the famous Sun-Liang-Kang debate, Liang Qichao (梁啟超, a conventional, renowned advocate for parliamentary monarchy) tried to turn the public reception around, commenting that “*ge* indeed is inevitable. But it is the British mode of ‘revolution’ that we need, not the violence of French *révolutions* or guillotines as people understand them.”<sup>19</sup> The intentional omission of *ming* throughout his op-ed was to manoeuvre people to only think of political *ge* in general, but of neither the mandate of heaven nor the life of the emperor. Sun Yat-sen, a more radical revolutionary, rebutted,

China, after all, cannot avoid a *geming* ... But since *geming* first appeared in *I Ching*, since Tang-Wu, we have seen more than twenty dynastic *geming*, yet when will China’s enlightenment come? ... Therefore what was called *geming* in the past was only superficial and not systematic, they were ... unprogressive *geming*. The new century shall not see those again, and we shall start a more fundamental *geming*.<sup>20</sup>

The people were largely enraptured by the incendiary thought of fomenting an unprecedented *geming*, and many joined the Nationalists in passion.<sup>21</sup> The acclaim for the op-ed of Sun, together with the publication and the increasing circulation of *Revolutionary Army*, accumulated the zeal for a fundamental *geming* to an extent hitherto unseen. *Geming*, frozen and invariant for thousands of years, was revolutionised, coated by advanced Western ideologies and beautified by the Literati: it became a word of fad, lasting until the breakout of WWII diverted public concerns.

Lu Xun, revered now as the voice of the nation’s conscience but highly controversial then, wrote a discerning satirical novel, *The True Story of Ah Q*, on the beautification of *geming*. The protagonist, Ah Q, first abhorred the revolutionaries against Qing as he thought it was unethical rebellion. Yet seeing all the bureaucrats and landlords more abhorred than him, he declared himself a revolutionary, fancying himself smart, browbeating these squires. He said, “*geming* is all right. I’ll *ge* those bitches’ *ming*! (革這伙媽媽的命, I’ll revolt against those bitches, or I’ll eradicate the bitches’ lives) How horrid, how hateful they are!”<sup>22</sup> Not having enjoyed much privilege, he was satirically soon executed by the government

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19. Qichao Liang, “釋革 (Explaining Ge),” 新民叢報, December 14, 1902,

20. Yat-sen Sun, “新世紀之革命 (Revolution of the New Century),” 新世紀, 1 1905,

21. Feng, “Revolution & Republicanism.”

22. Lu Xun 魯迅, chap. 1 in 魯迅全集 (*The Complete Works of Lu Xun*) (Beijing: 中華書局, December 1981), 513.

troops in a mopping-up operation. Lu gave an accurate description of the zeitgeist of his time,<sup>23</sup> along with a criticism of the insanity that went on around *geming*: The revolutionised concept of *geming*, seeming promising, inspiring and exhilarating, naturally struck a deep chord in the hearts of the people, circulating to even illiterates like Ah Q.

### 3.2 From Literary Revolution to Revolutionary Literature

After Xinhai Revolution came the Vernacular Revolution. Following the May Fourth Movement, Literary Chinese (文言), inherited directly from the grammar and vocabulary of Chou-Dynasty inscriptions, was by large gotten rid of, and Vernacular (白話) writings became in vogue. The advocates, however, were disillusioned finding their Vernacular compositions not as elegant as Literary ones.<sup>24</sup> Some recalled the accolades of *Revolutionary Army*, attempting to replicate its success in the Vernacular, which proved to be a complete coup, as it grasped the two most voguish subjects: *geming* and the Vernacular. Hymns to the revolutionised *geming* in intriguing Vernacular style were soon the prevalence of the literary world.

More significantly, the new revolutionary discourse hence commenced reflected the alteration of political philosophy. Besides the Sun-Liang-Kang debate, the following decades saw discourses on Xinhai Revolution, Northern Expeditionary Revolutionaries (北伐革命軍) and the Chinese Civil War. Just like Sun, whichever side had the most fundamentally revolutionary ideology received the greatest popularity and had the victory automatically.<sup>25,26,27</sup> Lu Xun commented, “this *geming* has even plagued the literary world ... The op-ed even abetted us to follow the examples of Gabriele D’Annunzio and Gerhart Hauptmann ...”<sup>28</sup> The Machiavellianism of the revolutionary authors was that the prestige they could gain justified whatever calibres and theses their writings had. Therefore, they gladly learnt from the provocative expressions of D’Annunzio and Hauptmann, one being fascistic, the other imperialistic – and their so-called Chinese revolutionary literature, au contraire, was supposedly aimed to revolt

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23. Paul Foster, *Ah Q Archaeology: Lu Xun, Ah Q, Ah Q Progeny, and the National Character Discourse in Twentieth-Century China* (Lanham: Lexington Books, April 2008), 94.

24. Lu Xun 魯迅, “革命文學 (Revolutionary Literature),” 民衆旬刊 (*People’s Ten-Day Periodical*), October 1927,

25. Ibid.

26. Eva Shan Chou, *Memory, Violence, Queues: Lu Xun Interprets China* (Michigan: Association for Asian Studies Publications, 2012), 124–126.

27. David Apter and Tony Saich, *Revolutionary Discourse in Mao’s Republic* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 257–260.

28. Lu Xun 魯迅, “革命文學 (Revolutionary Literature).”

against these very ideologies. Lu Xun criticised them either as being unoriginal (written behind the rear under protection), or consisting of merely romantic nihilism (fantasies florid with words like “killing,” “massacring” but nothing substantial).<sup>29</sup> Nevertheless, Lu Xun was harshly censured by his contemporaries for being discordant, despite his discerning pen directed at the social evils, e.g. the foresighted concern that the unworried and pompous revolutionary literature would make the anti-Japanese united front undisciplined, negligent and sluggish.<sup>30</sup> Eventually, despite Lu Xun’s efforts, this fad of revolutionary literature did not fade out of the political picture, as later, Communists produced a large corpus of revolutionary literature in the same fanatical manner, the most momentous ones being the Yan’an Literature.<sup>31</sup>

### 3.3 Cultural Revolution: *Geming* (革命, Correctness)

The permanent revolution theory was a crux of Marxism,<sup>32</sup> as it would sufficiently sustain the authority of the Party or its Chairperson. In PRC (People’s Republic of China), this was implemented through not only revolutionary movements but also “permanent revolutionary literature.”<sup>33</sup> This kind of literature was not limited to published essays or op-eds, alongside which were also ubiquitous Big-Character Posters (大字報), allowing the peasantry to engage in the movements as well.

Mao, through the CCP’s control over the media and propagandas, utilising the momentum of the change of the meaning of *geming*, started to modify the word for his own use. Revolutionary discourse, composed of influential essays delivered by robust grass-roots governments and of unnumbered Big-Character Posters densely covering the walls of virtually every building in rural China, which was inhabited by more than 90% of the population.<sup>34</sup>

The movements, with the Land Reform and the Great Leap Forward (大跃进) being the most significant ones, were either directed at incessant class struggles or at reproducing the Industrial Revolution

29. Lu Xun 魯迅, “革命文學 (Revolutionary Literature).”

30. Lu Xun 魯迅, “答徐懋庸並關於抗日統一戰線問題 (Response to Xu Maoyong’s Letter, with Discussion about Issues Regarding the Anti-Japanese United Front),” 作家 (Writers), August 1936,

31. Apter and Saich, *Revolutionary Discourse in Mao’s Republic*, 257–260.

32. Friedrich Engels, “The French Working Class and the Presidential Elections,” *Gesamtausgabe* 7 (1 1848).

33. Stuart Schram, “Mao Tse-tung and the Theory of the Permanent Revolution: 1958–69,” *The China Quarterly* 46 (April 1971): 221–244.

34. The Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, “Communique of the Tenth Plenary Meeting of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China” (The Chinese Communist Party, The Xinhua News Agency, September 1962).



of Britain in less than 15 years. *Geming*, around this time, was completely remoulded as a symbol of ultimate correctness, through its innumerable reiterations in the political discourse filled with glorifications of the CCP and its *geming* line.<sup>35</sup> If anything was to *ge dizhu-de ming* (eradicate the landlords), then it must be *geming-de* (revolutionary) and thus correct; if anything was for *gongye geming* (Industrial Revolution), then it must be carried on, no matter how many peasants starved to death in the Great Chinese Famine.

The revolutionary literature line, though establishing great authority of the CCP because it was the sole source of all *geming-de* instructions, undermined Mao's personal reputation in the Party given the pitiful sight of the Famine.<sup>36</sup> To restore his authority, Mao started the Cultural Revolution against all the non-proletariat and non-peasantry, a prolonged turbulence aimed at class struggle, in which all authority, all *geming-de* instructions, came from the *Little Red Book* by Mao. He instructed, "the toppled ruling class are still unreconciled and waiting for opportunities to be restored ... Thus we must constantly struggle; this is a principle in Marx-Leninism ... sometimes the struggle can become very fierce ... We have to be constantly alert."<sup>37</sup> His teachings became the ultimate gospel, around which Chinese people began a decade-long debate involving mass lynching and armed skirmishes, which ended only after he died.<sup>38</sup>

*Geming*, having become a sore spot of the people consequently, was no longer paraded by any Chinese politician since then,<sup>39</sup> though the revolutionary literature line has not ended yet: Immediately after Cultural Revolution, the *de facto* leader, Deng Xiaoping, implemented the Reform and Opening-Up policies, which marked, as he summarised in 1985, China's "second revolution,"<sup>40</sup> which lasted to this day. Since then, numerous movements, under the name of "*gaige*" (改革, to reform and revolutionise), were conducted to revolutionise the economy, military and society of China.<sup>41</sup> *Gaige*, in essence, was *de facto geming* in its Mao-era sense in that every means to the end of *gaige* was worth it; "be it a black cat or a white cat, a cat that can catch mice is a good cat."<sup>42</sup> Consequently, whether local officials *gaige* or

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35. Schram, "Mao Tse-tung and the Theory of the Permanent Revolution."

36. Ibid.

37. The Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, "Communique of the Tenth Plenary Meeting of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China."

38. Schram, "Mao Tse-tung and the Theory of the Permanent Revolution."

39. Larson, "Revolutionary Discourse and the Spirit."

40. The Central Intelligence Agency et al., *China's Second Revolution* (The National Foreign Intelligence, January 2013), 1.

41. Ibid., 11–12.

42. "不管黑貓白貓, 捉到老鼠就是好貓," 新華社, October 2008,

not became the exact opposite of whether they revolt against the government: As they all followed the *gaige* instructions, they were merely the docile lackeys of the CCP.

## 4 Conclusion

“言而無文，行之不遠”<sup>43</sup> (words undocumented will have no profound impact) was an influential saying by Vassal Xiang of Song documented in Chou. An autocracy will exert the “profound impact” it desires on the populace through manipulation of words in the political discourse. A concept eradicated from the discourse, will be paralysed and alienated at best; a word, having its connotations surreptitiously substituted, after reiterated for numerous times, will make the public believe it has always carried the same meaning as it now does.

This paper has examined how the first etymology of *geming* was induced by a need to describe the revolutionary pattern of Tang-Wu under a deterministic religion, and more importantly, to justify Chou’s legitimacy using the model of *geming*, reconsigning heaven’s mandate. Then in Han Dynasty, *geming* was gradually stripped from the discourse as the emperors wanted to exterminate the model of *geming* in order to stabilise their empire. This paper also delved into the second etymology of *geming* with its subsequent zealous usage in revolutionary discourse; since the Sun-Kang-Liang debate, fundamental *geming* had become a symbol of fashion, about which the Literati rivalled to romanticise. Then in Mao’s era, under campaigns following the permanent revolution theory, the most *geming-de* discourse became the most Communist and correct, inducing the publication of the *Little Red Book* and Cultural Revolution. In Deng’s reign, *gaige* was furtively substituted for *geming*, and China’s Second Revolution, disguised in *gaige*, lasts to this day.

These parallels manifests that the recurrent substantial modifications of *geming* in political discourses are results of it being firmly affixed to the status of those in power. And a society never would be able to break loose from this habituation so long as the usage of *geming* is still manoeuvred by the government. If we want to refresh *geming* to reveal its original colours now that the Chinese incumbents have chosen to ingrain *geming* (*gaige*) in the official jargon, the jargon must be abandoned once and for all.

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43. Zuo Qiuming 左丘明, “襄公,” in 左传, trans. Li Liu (Beijing: 中华书局, April 2007).

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